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Corrupting Cooperation and How Anti-Corruption Strategies May Backfire 21 
 22 
Understanding how humans sustain cooperation in large, anonymous societies remains a central 23 
question of both theoretical and practical importance. In the laboratory, experimental-behavioral 24 
research using tools like Public Goods Games suggests that cooperation can be sustained by 25 
institutional punishment—analogous to governments, police forces, and other institutions that 26 
sanction free-riders on behalf of individuals in large societies1-3. In the real world, however, 27 
corruption can undermine the effectiveness of these institutions4-8. Levels of corruption correlate 28 
with institutional, economic, and cultural factors, but the causal directions of these relationships 29 
are difficult to determine5,6,8-10. Here we experimentally model corruption, by introducing the 30 
possibility of bribery. We investigate the effect of structural factors (leader’s punitive power and 31 
economic potential), anti-corruption strategies (transparency and leader investment in the public 32 
good), and cultural background. The results reveal that: (a) corruption possibilities cause a large 33 
(25%) decrease in public good provisioning; (b) empowering leaders decreases cooperative 34 
contributions (in direct opposition to typical institutional punishment results); (c) growing up in a 35 
more corrupt society predicts more acceptance of bribes; and, (d) anti-corruption strategies are 36 
effective under some conditions, but can further decrease public good provisioning when leaders 37 
are weak and economic potential is poor. These results suggest that a more nuanced approach to 38 
corruption is needed, and that proposed panaceas, such as transparency, may actually be harmful 39 
in some contexts. 40 
 41 
Cooperation, particularly large-scale anonymous cooperation, remains an important puzzle to 42 
both evolutionary and social scientists, with real world social and economic implications. One 43 
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method for sustaining cooperation that has received considerable attention involves costly 44 
punishment11-13, whereby individuals pay a cost to punish free riders who fail to contribute to the 45 
public good. While cross-cultural evidence shows the ubiquity of costly punishment in large-46 
scale societies (though not in small-scale societies), there is some variability in both the 47 
motivation to punish free riders and the tendency to punish cooperators (i.e. some societies 48 
display significant levels of anti-social punishment, the punishment of cooperators)14-16.  49 
Research on the role of peer punishment in sustaining cooperation reveals two major 50 
challenges: (a) the second order free-rider problem in which individuals defect on the job of 51 
punishing and thereby increase their payoffs17,18, and (b) the problem of counter-punishment—52 
punishment as revenge for previously being punished12,19. Institutional, or pool, punishment 53 
resolves these problems by designating one individual as a “Leader” who can extract taxes and 54 
punish free-riders on behalf of other players2. Institutional punishment reduces the problems of 55 
both second-order free-riding and counter-punishment, and may thus be important in explaining 56 
the emergence and maintenance of large-scale cooperation3. Moreover, recent empirical research 57 
shows that participants (at least WEIRD participants20) prefer institutional punishment to peer 58 
punishment1,21.  59 
Institutional punishment, as typically modelled in Public Goods Games (PGGs), serve to 60 
incentivize player choices when contributing to the public pool, and work by constraining leader 61 
choices to either punishing players or doing nothing. In the real-world, however, channels such 62 
as bribery, nepotism, and lobbying allow individuals (or corporations) to avoid contributing to 63 
the public pool (e.g., evading taxes) as well as avoid being punished (e.g., by paying a bribe 64 
instead)—real leaders and institutions are corruptible. 65 
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Corruption is widespread, unevenly distributed, and costly. The World Bank estimates 66 
that worldwide, US$1 trillion is paid in bribes alone7. However, levels of corruption vary 67 
considerably. In Kenya, estimates suggest that 8 out of 10 interactions with public officials 68 
require a bribe and that the average urban Kenyan pays a bribe 16 times a month22. In contrast, 69 
the average Dane may never pay a bribe in their lifetime; Denmark has the lowest level of 70 
corruption based on the Corruption Perceptions Index23. The predicted costs of corruption vary 71 
from reductions in food redistribution anti-poverty programs24 to deaths from collapsed 72 
buildings4. Most recently, corruption has been identified as a contributing factor to the Greek 73 
economic crisis—Greece has the highest level of corruption in the European Union (EU), with 74 
recent estimates placing it near China and Brazil23. Corruption in EU states, such as Greece, 75 
potentially undermine the future of the EU. But, while levels of corruption correlate with 76 
institutional, economic, and cultural factors, the causal interconnections among these factors 77 
remain difficult to disentangle8,9,25. 78 
To model corruption, we modified the institutional punishment PGG (IPGG from herein). 79 
In a public goods game, players are given an endowment which they can divide between 80 
themselves and a public pool. The public pool is multiplied by some amount and then divided 81 
equally among players, regardless of contribution. A cooperative dilemma is created by setting 82 
the multiplier such that it is in every player’s best interest to let others contribute, contributing 83 
nothing themselves, but in the group’s best interest for all players to contribute their entire 84 
endowment so that they all reap the maximum benefits of the multiplier. In the IPGG, one player 85 
is randomly selected as a leader who can punish using taxes extracted from other players. Past 86 
research has shown the effectiveness of using designated leaders as institutional punishers1,2,21.  87 
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To introduce bribery, we modified the IPGG by giving players and leaders one additional 88 
choice, thereby creating the Bribery Game (BG). Players in addition to dividing their endowment 89 
between themselves and the public pool can also offer some of this endowment to improve the 90 
leader’s payoff (i.e., effectively offering a bribe, though we use neutral language). In turn, leaders 91 
have an additional exclusive choice in addition to punishing or doing nothing to players: leaders 92 
can choose to take the contribution (i.e., accept the bribe) or not. We chose to make punishing, 93 
accepting bribes, or doing nothing to each player an exclusive choice for simplicity and because 94 
past research suggests that a non-exclusive choice would reduce or remove the impact of the 95 
bribe on decision-making10—in reality, a bribe with no effect wouldn’t last long. A new leader 96 
was selected each round to remove any reputational effects, turning the game into a series of 97 
repeated one-shot encounters. We manipulate the pool multiplier (a proxy for economic 98 
potential) and the punishment multiplier (the power of the leader to punish). In the BG, we also 99 
introduce three corruption mitigation strategies: partial transparency (revealing leader 100 
contributions), full transparency (revealing all leader behavior, including bribe taking), and 101 
leader investment (forcing leaders to contribute their endowment to the public pool). We focus 102 
on transparency and discuss leader investment, which requires further investigation, in the 103 
Supplementary Information. We ran the experiment using a Canadian Economic Subject Pool 104 
open to the public, with native-born, and first and second-generation immigrants with diverse 105 
backgrounds. 106 
We assume players (a) bring cultural differences, shaped by their different ethnic 107 
backgrounds and cultural exposure, into the game and (b) adjust their behaviours via exposure to 108 
the experimental setting, closer to the equilibrium that maximizes payoffs in the game. We 109 
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model an IPGG with a fixed tax rate to more realistically capture a world in which taxes are not 110 
directly correlated with punishment and where leaders punish without a large cost to themselves 111 
(since their own taxes are a small part of the taxes contributing to the pool punishment or 112 
institution). We then modify this game to a BG by offering players and leaders the choice to 113 
offer and accept bribes. It is easy to see that without punishment, contributions will tend toward 114 
zero—contribution levels are contingent on the strength of leaders and their tendency to punish 115 
low contributors. We predict that leaders will use taxes to punish in the IPGG, since these are not 116 
personally costly and benefit the leader’s payoff by increasing the size of the public good. 117 
Increased leader strength predicts higher contributions and more public good provisioning. In the 118 
PG, we predict that players have no incentive to offer contributions or bribes unless they are 119 
punished for not doing so. However, when bribery is an option, leaders have a greater incentive 120 
to punish people for not offering brides than for not contributing, since their share of the public 121 
good will be smaller than a bribe multiplied by every player. More power gives leaders an 122 
increased ability to impose their will, increasing the rate of bribery at the expense of the public 123 
good. Thus, in contrast to the IPGG, we predict that stronger leaders in the BG should reduce 124 
contributions and public good provisioning. However, if players have a preference for 125 
contributions over bribes (such as if their prior experience is a world where potential returns on 126 
the public good are higher or where anti-corruption norms are adaptive), then the incentive to 127 
punish brides over contributions is dampened. In contrast, growing up in a more corrupt society 128 
may lead to a higher preference for eliciting, offering, and accepting bribes. The full set of 129 
predictions are provided in Supplementary Information. 130 
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Cost of corruption. To examine the costs of corruption, we compared the IPGG and BG. We 131 
find that when bribery is an option, mean contributions drop by 25%. The difference between 132 
these conditions (estimated using an MCMC GLMM regression; Table S2) represents a 0.43 133 
[CI95: -0.49,-0.38] standard deviation loss (1.4 points per period; equivalent to 14% of initial 134 
endowment or $2.10 over the course of the game). Not surprisingly, when corruption can enter, it 135 
does, and cooperation deteriorates.  136 
Causes of corruption. Having established the impact of bribery on cooperation, we examine the 137 
causes of this corruption. In Table 1 and Figure 1 we use an MCMC categorical GLMM to 138 
estimate the effect of (1) our different treatments, (2) cultural experience and (3) background on 139 
leader decisions. Leaders with a stronger punishment multiplier at their disposal (“Stronger 140 
Leader”) were about twice as likely to accept bribes and about 3 times less likely to do nothing. 141 
In contrast, when accepting bribes is not an option (IPGG), these more powerful leaders were as 142 
likely to do nothing (see Leader Decisions in Supplementary Information). Thus, as expected, 143 
more power led to more corrupt behavior. 144 
Exploring individual variation, we found that those who grew up in more corrupt 145 
countries were more willing to accept bribes. For every one standard deviation increase in 146 
players’ exposure corruption scores (see Corruption Perception Scores in Supplementary 147 
Information for details on how these scores were constructed and the distribution of these scores 148 
in our sample), leaders were 1.2 times more likely to accept a bribe. In contrast, when players’ 149 
parental heritage included countries with higher corruption norms (i.e. more perceived 150 
corruption), leaders were 1.5 times less likely to accept bribes for every standard deviation 151 
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increase in corruption score, and 1.6 times more likely to do nothing (see Figure 1; 152 
Supplementary Information shows all models). In combination with other evidence5,6,26-29, we 153 
suspect our corruption exposure scores are capturing internalized social norms related to 154 
corruption acquired while growing up in different communities. Meanwhile, our parental 155 
heritage effects, which are driven by our Canadian-born participants (e.g., second generation 156 
immigrants), may capture an internalized reaction against ethnic stereotyping—i.e., a reaction 157 
against the assumption of corrupt behavior from those of their heritage21.  158 
 159 
 160 
Table 1 | Leader Decision Each column reports the odds ratio and 95% confidence interval of the behavior in the 161 
column heading (e.g. Accept Bribe in column 1) compared to engaging in one of the other two behaviors (e.g. 162 
Punish or Do Nothing for column 1). The odds are estimated using an MCMC categorical GLMM, with the behavior 163 
coded as 1 and the other two behaviors coded as 0. The confidence intervals are Highest Posterior Density (HPD) 164 
intervals. Each model regresses the behavior in the Bribery Game (with no transparency or leader investment) on 165 
economic potential (low vs. high), leadership strength (weak vs. strong), and both player’s and leader’s exposure 166 
corruption score (z-score) and heritage corruption score (z-score), controlling for period, order of conditions, order 167 
of background questions, group size, age, and gender with random effects for individuals within groups. Here we 168 
report only the predictors of interest. The full model is reported in Supplementary Information. 169 
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 170 
Figure 1 | Leader Decision A graphical representation of the odds ratio and 95% confidence interval of the 171 
behavior in Table 1. 172 
 173 
Cures for corruption.  Having generated corruption, we attempted to suppress it by modifying 174 
the BG using two different forms of transparency measures and by forcing leaders to invest in 175 
the public good. The first transparency approach, Partial Transparency, allowed all players to see 176 
the leader’s contribution, thereby offering leaders an opportunity to establish or reveal a norm by 177 
revealing to players how much or how little leaders invested in the public pool. The second 178 
transparency approach, Full Transparency, allowed players to see all leader actions: leader 179 
contributions, the anonymized contributions and bribes from each player, and the leader’s 180 
decision in each case. Leader Investment forced leaders to maximally contribute their 181 
endowment to the public good, thereby tying a large part of their payoff to the efficiency of the 182 
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public good. Tying leader payoffs to the success of the public good has explicitly been used as 183 
one aspect of an anti-corruption measure in places such as Singapore, which has one of the 184 
lowest levels of corruption (based on Corruption Perception Index23) and the highest paid leader 185 
in the world30. Singaporean minister salaries are pegged at the salaries of top professionals and 186 
Singapore’s Gross Domestic Product (GDP). The Leader Investment treatment is designed to be 187 
similar to linking leader payoffs to a country’s GDP, but in a way that minimally deviates from 188 
the other treatment designs. This treatment, though interesting, has certain caveats in its 189 
interpretation, and requires further investigation. We report its effect and discuss these issues in 190 
more detail in the Supplementary Information. 191 
To determine the effectiveness of these anti-corruption measures, we compared 192 
contributions in each condition to the IPGG (control) and to the BG. We regressed contributions 193 
(z-scores) on treatment, economic potential, and leader strength. Figure 2 summarizes the results 194 
of this regression and reports separate coefficients within each condition. Note that these values 195 
come from a single model and are calculated by changing reference groups (see Supplementary 196 
Information). Raw mean contribution values are graphed in Figure 3. 197 
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[INSERT FIGURE 2]198 
 199 
Figure 2 | Cures for corruption Coefficients and colors indicate the effect on contributions, on public goods 200 
provisioning. Deeper blue shading indicates greater public goods provision and darker red indicates reduced public 201 
goods. All coefficients are extracted from a single model by changing reference groups. The 4 large rectangles show 202 
the effect of each treatment with weak and strong leaders (columns) and poor and rich economic potential (rows). 203 
Within each rectangle, the columns represent the reference group treatment (Control, BG). Each row reports the 204 
coefficient of each treatment compared to this reference group. Contributions are z-scores, so coefficients represent 205 
standardized differences. The full model is reported in the SI. In all models, we account for the clustering inherent in 206 
the experimental design by including a fixed effect for the number of subjects and random effects for participants 207 
within groups. Note that in all treatments and structural contexts, the BG has lower contributions than the 208 
structurally equivalent IPGG (control). Corruption mitigation effectively increases contributions (though not to 209 
control levels) when leaders are strong or economic potential is rich. When leaders are weak and economic potential 210 
is poor, the apparent corruption mitigation strategy Full Transparency has no effect and Partial Transparency further 211 
decrease contributions. 212 
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 213 
 214 
Figure 3 | Contributions by condition Raw contributions for each within-subject treatments in between-subjects 215 
structural contexts with 95% confidence intervals. These data are consistent with our theory, which predicts that 216 
more powerful leaders increase contributions in the IPGG, but decrease contributions in the BG. 217 
 218 
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Figure 2 and 3 reveal that stronger leaders are better able to increase the efficiency of public 219 
goods provisioning when economic potential is poor and bribery is not an option (red bars in top 220 
row), but when bribery is an option (blue bars), stronger leaders in poor contexts reduce the 221 
efficiency of the public good, making themselves wealthy at the expense of other players. 222 
Corruption mitigation effectively increases contributions (though not to control levels) when 223 
leaders are strong or economic potential is rich. When leaders are weak and economic potential 224 
is poor, the apparent corruption mitigation strategy Full Transparency has no effect and Partial 225 
Transparency further decreases contributions to levels lower than the standard BG—it led to less 226 
public good provisioning.  227 
Although the cost of bribery was seen in all contexts, in poor economic contexts, the 228 
already low contributions were reduced even further. That is, even if powerful leaders are 229 
accepting bribes at comparable levels in both poor and rich economic contexts, the degree of 230 
corruption may not be as visible if economic potential is high. Leaders in richer economic 231 
contexts, like the United States, may accept “bribes” in the form of lobbying or campaign 232 
funding, which may indeed reduce the efficiency of the public good, but this cost isn’t as obvious 233 
since economic potential is already much higher than in other nations. In contrast, in poorer 234 
economic contexts like the Democratic Republic of Congo, corruption further reduces the 235 
already low public good provisioning. Unfortunately, our results suggest that in these contexts 236 
with weak institutions and poor economic potential, efforts to mitigate corruption, such as 237 
transparency or leader investment, could backfire, further reducing investments in the public 238 
good. These results reflect leaders lacking the power to increase contributions through 239 
punishment and thus recouping the cost of their investment in the public good by accepting 240 
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bribes. Transparency in this context, reveals a low contribution norm. Thus, the lessons in 241 
fighting corruption when institutions have the power to sustain public goods (if only corruption 242 
were reduced) and the potential for economic growth is high, may not only fail to apply when 243 
these conditions are not met, but can worsen the situation. 244 
Our results suggest that the effect of exposure to different institutions and norms persist 245 
after moving to a new environment. This increase in corrupt behavior with direct exposure to 246 
corrupt institutions or norms is consistent with the internalization of perceived norms5,6,26,27 and 247 
with previous empirical data showing, for example, that diplomats from high-corruption 248 
countries accumulate more unpaid parking violations29. However, the decreased probability of 249 
accepting bribes among those whose cultural background includes more corrupt countries, 250 
suggests that second-generation and later migrants are not as corrupt as their peers from less 251 
corrupt nations. This may represent the self-selection of immigrants from their home countries or 252 
may be a form of “identity denial”21, whereby acculturated individuals actively avoid the 253 
stereotypes of their inherited ethnic labels. Although we have a large range of corruption scores 254 
(see Corruption Perception Scores in Supplementary Information), our sample is limited to 255 
migrants in a Canadian context and further investigation is required to determine if these cultural 256 
results generalize. Together these results suggest that corruption may be rooted in structural 257 
factors, but that internalized corruption norms may cause these behaviors to persist in a new 258 
context. 259 
Overall, these results suggest that: (a) stronger institutions and leaders are required to 260 
sustain public goods contributions when economic potential is poor and the incentive to free-ride 261 
is high; (b) in this context, when able to, leaders will abuse their power with a noticeable 262 
economic cost. However, (c) even if economic potential is poor, if leaders are powerful, anti-263 
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corruption measures can be effective at increasing public good provisioning. Thus, efforts to 264 
mitigate corruption in poorer economic contexts must go hand-in-hand with strengthening 265 
institutions. When leaders have less punitive power, efforts such as transparency may have no 266 
effect or even decrease contributions since they reveal the rationality of low public good 267 
contributions and that most leaders do not contribute. In a rich context with powerful punitive 268 
institutions, there may be multiple equilibria that just require norms (activated in our game by 269 
transparency) to stabilize a higher payoff. In contrast, in a poor context with weak institutions, 270 
there is only one equilibria—bribe offers and low public good provisioning. 271 
Though these experimental results begin to offer insights into the causal effect of 272 
corruption on cooperation, extending such experimental findings demands great caution. 273 
Laboratory work on the causes and cures of corruption must inform and be informed by real 274 
world investigations of corruption from around the globe. Thus, aiming only to drive future 275 
investigation, our results suggest that as economic potential grows, less government intervention 276 
is required to enforce cooperation and increased power may be misused, requiring greater anti-277 
corruption efforts. In contrast, when economic potential is poor, strong government intervention 278 
is most effective at decreasing free-riding, as long as this intervention is paired with strategies to 279 
mitigate corruption. This may help explain why intuitions about “cures for corruption” based on 280 
experiences in rich nations do not work as well in poorer nations.  281 
 282 
Methods 283 
Participants. We had a total of 274 participants (166 female, mean age 20.90) drawn 284 
from an Economic Subject Pool open to the public. Participant ethnic backgrounds were as 285 
follows: 63 Euro Canadians, 158 East Asians, 17 South Asians, 36 Other Ethnicities. Participants 286 
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played in groups of between 4 and 7 players. Ethical approval was obtained from the UBC 287 
Behavioural Research Ethics Board (H12-02457). Informed consent was obtained from all 288 
participants prior to beginning the study. Participants were randomly assigned to experimental 289 
groups. 290 
Experimental Design. We used a 2 (high vs low economic potential) x 2 (weak vs strong 291 
leader power) between-subjects experimental design with 5 within-subject treatments: 292 
(institutional punishment public goods game; control (n=205), bribery game (n=222), bribery 293 
game with partial transparency (n=228), bribery game with full transparency (n=204), bribery 294 
game with leader investment(n=196)) with random allocation to all treatments. Sample size in 295 
the low economic potential, weak leader power was 71; low economic potential, strong leader 296 
power was 68; high economic potential, weak leader power was 68; and high economic potential, 297 
strong leader power was 67. 298 
In the real world, leaders make institutional decisions based on a fixed budget to which 299 
they are one among many contributors and which has to be spent. To better model these 300 
conditions, we extracted fixed taxes for punishment, which were discarded if not used. 301 
Participants were randomly assigned to one of the 4 between-subjects treatments and 4 of the 5 302 
within-subjects treatments. 303 
To test possible contributing causes of corruption, we randomly assigned each group of 304 
participants to a treatment with either high or low (i) marginal per capita rate of return (0.3 vs. 305 
0.6) as a measure of economic potential and (ii) a punishment multiplier (1 vs. 3) as a measure of 306 
the strength of the leader or institution. The marginal per capita rate of return is the expected 307 
return for every point invested in the public pool and the punishment multiplier is the number of 308 
points subtracted from a sanctioned player for every tax point spent on punishing that player.  309 
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Within-subject treatments were played in a random order with pre-recorded video 310 
instructions prior to each period. A quiz was given prior to beginning, to ensure participants 311 
knew how each treatment worked. This quiz along with the script and screenshots from the video 312 
can be found in Supplementary Information. We used a block randomization design, where 313 
participants played a minimum of 10 rounds, but the game may have ended at any point prior to 314 
the completion of 10 rounds. At 10 rounds, participants were informed which round the period 315 
ended or played further rounds until the game ended. In this way, we had 10 rounds to analyze 316 
without end game effects—participants did not know when the game would end. In order to 317 
remove reputational effects, for each round, the leader was also randomly selected. Random 318 
selection was with replacement, such that players also couldn’t say that the same person couldn’t 319 
be the leader for a consecutive round. As such, the experiment can be interpreted as a series of 320 
one-shot interactions. Participants were paid for 10 random rounds from across all conditions. 321 
They were paid at a rate of 15c per point, with a show up fee of $10. 322 
Measures. We measured Age, Gender, University Degree or Occupation and Major or 323 
Industry, Prestige/Dominance, Right Wing Authoritarianism, whether they spent their entire life 324 
in Canada, where else they’ve lived, what suburb they grew up in, ethnic group, Religion and 325 
importance of religion, how well they speak the language of their ethnic heritage (Cultural 326 
Competence), Inclusion of Other in the Self Scale  (Identification with their Ethnic Group and 327 
Identification with Canadians), Vancouver Index of Acculturation, and Mainstream vs Heritage 328 
Acculturation (Integration into Culture). Two corruption scores were calculated for each person 329 
using the mean perception of corruption index from Transparency International for all of the 330 
countries the participant have lived in and all countries from which they derived their ethnic 331 
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heritage. The corruption index begins at 0 (most corrupt) up to 100 (least corrupt). For each 332 
country, we subtracted this value from 100 (so that higher scores indicated higher corruption). 333 
Perception of corruption was chosen as the measure of corruption as it indicated the perceived 334 
norm for national corruption.  335 
The heritage corruption score primarily represents the potential influence of vertically 336 
transmitted corruption norms (parent to child), whereas the exposure corruption score represents 337 
corruption norms which the participant may have acquire through non-parental cultural 338 
transmission or direct experience.  339 
We asked the last 39 groups (194 participants) their preferences for the conditions of the 340 
game. These participants were asked these questions after taking all other measures so that they 341 
were no different to the preceding 17 groups (79 participants). We report these preferences, 342 
along with details of all measures in the SI. 343 
Data Availability Data can be downloaded at https://doi.org/10.6084/m9.figshare.5004956 344 
References 345 
1 Fehr, E. & Williams, T. Endogenous emergence of institutions to sustain cooperation 346 
(2013). 347 
2 O'Gorman, R., Henrich, J. & Van Vugt, M. Constraining free riding in public goods 348 
games: designated solitary punishers can sustain human cooperation. Proceedings of the 349 
Royal Society of London B: Biological Sciences 276, 323-329 (2009). 350 
3 Sigmund, K., De Silva, H., Traulsen, A. & Hauert, C. Social learning promotes 351 
institutions for governing the commons. Nature 466, 861-863 (2010). 352 
4 Ambraseys, N. & Bilham, R. Corruption kills. Nature 469, 153-155 (2011). 353 
5 Gächter, S. & Schulz, J. F. Intrinsic honesty and the prevalence of rule violations across 354 
societies. Nature (2016). 355 
6 Weisel, O. & Shalvi, S. The collaborative roots of corruption. Proceedings of the 356 
National Academy of Sciences 112, 10651-10656 (2015). 357 
7 Kaufmann, D. Myths and realities of governance and corruption. Available at SSRN 358 
829244 (2005). 359 
8 Treisman, D. What have we learned about the causes of corruption from ten years of 360 
cross-national empirical research? Annu. Rev. Polit. Sci. 10, 211-244 (2007). 361 
9 Treisman, D. The causes of corruption: a cross-national study. Journal of public 362 
economics 76, 399-457 (2000). 363 
 19 
10 Gneezy, U., Saccardo, S. & van Veldhuizen, R. Bribery: Greed versus reciprocity. (Social 364 
Science Research Center Berlin (WZB), 2016). 365 
11 Fehr, E. & Gachter, S. Cooperation and Punishment in Public Goods Experiments. 366 
American Economic Review 90, 980-994 (2000). 367 
12 Gächter, S., Renner, E. & Sefton, M. The long-run benefits of punishment. Science 322, 368 
1510-1510 (2008). 369 
13 Rockenbach, B. & Milinski, M. The efficient interaction of indirect reciprocity and costly 370 
punishment. Nature 444, 718-723 (2006). 371 
14 Henrich, J. et al. Costly punishment across human societies. Science 312, 1767-1770 372 
(2006). 373 
15 Henrich, J. et al. Markets, religion, community size, and the evolution of fairness and 374 
punishment. Science 327, 1480-1484 (2010). 375 
16 Herrmann, B., Thöni, C. & Gächter, S. Antisocial Punishment Across Societies. Science 376 
319, 1362-1367, doi:10.1126/science.1153808 (2008). 377 
17 Boyd, R. & Richerson, P. J. Punishment allows the evolution of cooperation (or anything 378 
else) in sizable groups. Ethology and sociobiology 13, 171-195 (1992). 379 
18 Panchanathan, K. & Boyd, R. Indirect reciprocity can stabilize cooperation without the 380 
second-order free rider problem. Nature 432, 499-502 (2004). 381 
19 Nikiforakis, N. Punishment and counter-punishment in public good games: Can we really 382 
govern ourselves? Journal of Public Economics 92, 91-112, 383 
doi:http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jpubeco.2007.04.008 (2008). 384 
20 Henrich, J., Heine, S. J. & Norenzayan, A. Most people are not WEIRD. Nature 466, 29-385 
29 (2010). 386 
21 Traulsen, A., Röhl, T. & Milinski, M. An economic experiment reveals that humans 387 
prefer pool punishment to maintain the commons. Proceedings of the Royal Society B: 388 
Biological Sciences, rspb20120937 (2012). 389 
22 Kenya, T. I. The Kenya urban bribery index.  (Transparency International--Kenya, 2001). 390 
23 Transparency International.     (2014). 391 
24 Olken, B. A. Corruption and the costs of redistribution: Micro evidence from Indonesia. 392 
Journal of public economics 90, 853-870 (2006). 393 
25 Pande, R. & Olken, B. Corruption in Developing Countries. Annual Review of Economics 394 
4, 479-509 (2012). 395 
26 Chudek, M. & Henrich, J. Culture–gene coevolution, norm-psychology and the 396 
emergence of human prosociality. Trends in cognitive sciences 15, 218-226 (2011). 397 
27 Chudek, M., Muthukrishna, M. & Henrich, J. in The Handbook of Evolutionary 398 
Psychology Vol. 2  (ed David M. Buss) Ch. 30, (John Wiley and Sons, 2015). 399 
28 Kimbrough, E. O. & Vostroknutov, A. Norms Make Preferences Social. (Department of 400 
Economics, Simon Fraser University, 2013). 401 
29 Fisman, R. & Miguel, E. Corruption, norms, and legal enforcement: Evidence from 402 
diplomatic parking tickets. Journal of Political economy 115, 1020-1048 (2007). 403 
30 Kuan Yew, L. From Third World to First World; the Singapore Story: 1965–2000.  404 
(Harper Collins Publishers, 2000). 405 
 406 
 20 
Acknowledgements J.H. acknowledges support from the Canadian Institute for Advanced 407 
Research. J.H. and P.F. acknowledge support from the Social Sciences and Humanities Research 408 
Council, Canada. 409 
Author Contributions M.M., P.F., S.P., and J.H. developed theory, designed the experiments, 410 
and wrote the paper. M.M. and S.P. carried out the experiments. M.M., S.P., and J.H. conducted 411 
the statistical analyses. The authors declare no competing financial interests.  412 
